

Message Text

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TAGS: IT PINT MORG PINR PINS
SUBJECT: GENERAL C.A. ALVARO RUBEO, COMMANDER OF THE
THIRD CORPS

1. GENERAL RUBEO SUCCEEDS GEN FABIO MOIZO WHO HAS BEEN
TRANSFERRED TO ROME AS ONE OF MEMBERS OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF. A THREE STAR GENERAL HE COMES FROM ROME
AND HAS JUST TAKEN OVER THE NORTHERN COMMAND.

2. AN ATHLETIC MAN BORN IN 1917 IN TOWN OF TAGLICOSZO,
PUGLIA, RUBEO HAS SPENT HIS ENTIRE LIFE AS MILITARY OFFICER,
MOST OF IT IN ITALY. HE ATTENDED A FRENCH MILITARY SCHOOL
AND HAS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY IN THE US ALTHOUGH HE HAS
NEVER BEEN POSTED THERE. HE HAS A LIMITED KNOWLEDGE
OF ENGLISH BUT A FAIRLY FLUENT KNOWLEDGE OF FRENCH. MARRIED
FOR ABOUT TWENTY YEARS, HE HAS ONE SEVENTEEN YEAR OLD SON WHO,
WITH HIS WIFE, IS STILL IN ROME. SALT AND PEPPER SHORT HAIR,
LEAN FACE AND BODY, ACCOMPLISHED TENNIS PLAYER AND SKIER THE
GENERAL IS ALSO A DEVOUT CATHOLIC AND APPARENTLY VERY MUCH
ATTACHED TO BOTH HIS WIFE AND SON.

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3. RUBEO SAID THAT HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN MILAN WERE ABOUT
HALF MILITARY AND ABOUT HALF POLITICAL. IN HIS PREVIOUS
INCARNATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS COMMANDER OF THE FIFTH CORPS
WHICH IS THE OPERATIONAL DEFENSE UNIT IN THE EASTERN AREA,
THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY OF A MILITARY NATURE.
HERE, HOWEVER, HE IS CONSTANTLY CALLED UPON BY POLITICAL AND

CIVIC GROUPS WHICH WANT TO HEAR WHAT THE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE NORTH HAS TO SAY. HE FEELS THAT HE IS VERY MUCH RESPONSIBLE FOR CONVEYING AN ACCURATE IMAGE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OF THE ARMED FORCES.

4. RUBEO DESCRIBES HIMSELF AS ONE HUNDRED PERCENT ANTI-COMMUNIST, HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN A CHILD OF SIX WHEN HIS FATHER HAD BEEN DRAGGED OUT BY THE FASCISTS AND BEATEN UP SO THAT HE KNEW WHAT TOTALITARIANISM WAS ALL ABOUT. HE HAD LIVED THROUGH THE FASCIST PERIOD AND EVEN THOUGH IT HAD MANY POSITIVE ASPECTS, ITS FATAL DEFECT WAS THAT IT DEPRIVED ITALY OF ITS FREEDOM. ITALY HAD LOST THE WAR BUT IN THE PROCESS IT HAD REGAINED ITS FREEDOM. NOW THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER IT COULD MAINTAIN THAT FREEDOM WHEN ITS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS WERE WEAKENED BY THE VERY POLITICAL PARTIES THAT MADE UP THE SOCIETY AND UNDER ATTACK BY THOSE WHO WISHED TO DESTROY IT. RUBEO FELT THAT THE FORMATION OF THE ANDREOTTI GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED BY THE COMMUNISTS WAS A MISTAKE. IT WAS ABSURD TO SAY THAT THIS WAS ANYTHING OTHER THAN A GOVERNMENT WITH THE COMMUNISTS. THEY HAD AND WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE A DECISIVE ROLE IN ALL DECISIONS. STILL, IT MAY HAVE BEEN UNAVOIDABLE. THE TIME TO HAVE STOPPED THIS SLIDE TOWARD COMMUNISM WAS TWENTY YEARS AGO. THAT WAS THE MOMENT TO LAY DOWN A CREATIVE ALTERNATIVE TO COMMUNISM AND TO BAR THE WAY TO ITS GROWTH. NOW, WITH TWELVE AND A HALF MILLION VOTES, NO ONE COULD DENY THAT THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD TO BE DEALT WITH AS A SERIOUS
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POLITICAL CONTENDER. THE COMMUNISTS HAD BENEFITED ENORMOUSLY DURING THESE YEARS FROM THEIR ROLE IN THE OPPOSITION. WHILE THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HAD THE HEAVY AND THANKLESS RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT, THE COMMUNISTS HAD THE LUXURY OF BEING IN THE OPPOSITION TO POINT OUT THEIR ERRORS. NO WONDER THE COMMUNISTS HAD GROWN SO RAPIDLY.

5. STILL, THERE WAS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS BEING A PART OF THE MAJORITY AND THEIR ACTUALLY HOLDING CABINET PORTFOLIOS. RUBEO HOPED THAT IT WOULD NEVER COME TO THE LATTER. HE FORESAW THE STEADY GROWTH OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IF THEY EVER ENTERED A CABINET UNTIL THEY HAD FINALLY TAKEN OVER ENTIRELY. THEN IT WOULD BE TOO LATE. IDEALLY, HE WOULD LIKE ITALY TO HAVE A COUPLE OF YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH A COMMUNIST REGIME. THAT WOULD INNOCULATE THE ITALIAN PUBLIC AGAINST COMMUNISM JUST AS IT HAD BEEN INNOCULATED AGAINST FASCISM. UNFORTUNATELY, HE SAID THAT A TRIAL OF COMMUNISM WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. ONCE THE COMMUNISTS HAD BEEN GIVEN CONTROL, THEY WOULD NEVER GIVE IT UP. THAT WOULD NOT MAKE A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFERENCE TO HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL. HE WAS NEAR THE END OF HIS CAREER AND WHETHER HE WAS APPOINTED TO SUBSEQUENT POSTS OR NOT WOULDN'T REALLY MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. BUT HE WAS

CONCERNED FOR HIS COUNTRY AND FOR THE YOUNG PEOPLE LIKE HIS SON WHO WOULD BE FACED WITH THE DANGER OF GROWING UP IN A TOTALITARIAN SOCIETY. AND IF FASCISM HAD BEEN BAD, COMMUNISM WOULD BE MANY TIMES WORSE. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT HIS SON HAD ALREADY DECIDED, ALTHOUGH HE WAS ONLY SEVENTEEN THAT IF THE COMMUNISTS CAME TO POWER HE WOULD EMMIGRATE TO CANADA OR THE US.

6. RUBEO FELT THAT THE ITALIAN PUBLIC WANTED TO WORK AND WANTED A PEACEFUL SOCIETY. HE CONTENDED THAT IT WAS ONLY AN AGGRESSIVE MINORITY THAT WAS FORCING THE PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS. HE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE YOUNG RECRUITS IN THE ARMED FORCES UNDER HIS COMMAND. THEY OBVIOUSLY REFLECT THE POLITICAL MILIEU FROM WHICH THEY ARE RECRUITED. BUT HE FELT
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CONFIDENT THAT IF CALLED UPON, THEY WOULD OBEY. IF THEY WOULD NOT, IT WOULD BE THE GREATEST TRAGEDY OF HIS LIFE. HE WOULD COMMIT SUICIDE IF HIS LEGAL ORDERS WERE DISOBEYED FOR POLITICAL REASONS,BUT HE DIDN'T THINK IT WOULD COME TO THAT.

7. AT THE PRESENT THERE WERE GROUND FORCES DEPLOYED IN ROME IN SUPPPORT OF THE POLICE. THERE WAS A SIMILAR PLAN THAT HAD BEEN COMPLETED IN MILAN JUST THIS MORNING. HE HAD THE UNITS THAT WOULD BE PUT AT THE DISPOSITION OFTHE PREFECT WHEN CALLED UPON. THEY WOULD NOT BE HAND PICKED SOLDIERS BUT PRE-CONSTITUTED UNITS THAT HE WAS NOT AFRAID TO COMMIT. HE DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH THE MEN HIMSELF, BUT HE HAD BEEN ASSURED BY THEIR IMMEDIATE OFFICERS THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEMS. THAT WHOLE PLAN WAS A CAREFULLY KEPT SECRET BUT HE FELT THAT ITALY'S SURVIVAL HINGED UPON THE CLOSENESS OF ITS SOLIDARITY WITH THE US AND HAD NO DIFFICULTY IN CONFIDING TO US ABOUT THE STATE OF THEIR READINESS.FINA

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